Gen Zia , Gen Akhtar and Geneva Agreement Part 1

Gen Zia , Gen Akhtar and Geneva Agreement Part 1

Author
Diego Cordoves and Seling s Harrison

The Geneva negotiations were stallen in mid – 1985 , nominally over the issue of a withdrawal timetable . But the cordovez recognized that the key reason for Soviet foot dragging was the lack of progress on a coalition formula that would stabilize the Kabul regime before the withdrawal started . In July he submitted a memorandum containing a ” Scenario ” for a coalition to Islamabad , Kabul , Moscow and Washington . He proposed a U.N – facilitated Geneva meeting of Afghanistan leaders to set up ” broadly based transitional arrangements ” that would embrace the seven parties , the PDPA and ” selected personalities ” among prominent Afghan exiles . Although the “Scenario” was not specific , Cordovez made clear that he saw a pivotal role for Zahir Shah in this scenario . Rejecting Najib Ullah’s demand for PDPA control of the presidency and the armed forces , he wrote that ” no party would be assured a predominate role in the transitional arrangements .
To put the picture in perspective , it should be noted that Pakistani leaders were not unanimous during 1987 with respect to the type of post war Afghan government that would best serve Pakistani interests . The ISI was more determined than ever to install a fundamentalist – dominated regime that it assumed would be closely linked to Islamabad . Gen Akhter Abdul Rehman Khan , the ISI Director argued that the talk of political compromise would dampen the fighting spirit of the resistance groups . Foreign Minister Yaqub Khan on the other hand maintained that a stable transition without bloodshed could be achieved only through a coalition that gave a key role to moderate resistance elements and included PDPA participation . Najib Ullah in the scenario would be replaced by a neutral personality. As it happened , although Yaqoob was unaware of the internal debate that raging in Moscow , he was pursuing a solution that was almost identical to what Kornienko and Akhromeyev had in mind . According to Riaz Mohammad Khan , then the Foreign Minister’s Director of Afghan Affairs , Yaqoob was convinced that the former King Zahir Shah , could play a pivotal role in the transitional period as a personality agreeable to Moscow and with visible support among nationalists and refugees .
President Zia agreed with the ISI approach , but he authorized Yaqoob to test the Soviet reaction . Yaqoob then embarked on what proved to be an abortive three – month diplomatic initiative during early 1987 . As he recalled in a 1992 interview , he knew that he would be actively subverted by the ISI and would get no help from Zia . Still he hoped that a conciliatory Soviet attitude would give him leverage in his internal battles . His first setback came when Soviet deputy Forign Minister Anatoliy visiting Islamabad in mid – January , made his expected appeal for acceptance of Najibullah’s “national reconciliation” overtures . Yaqoob countered with a proposal for a board – based coalition headed by a neutral personality .
Yaqoob made two trips to Moscow during February with a trip in between to Rome for a meeting with Zahir Shah’s advisers . The purpose of the Rome trip , writes Riaz Mohammad Khan ,” was to convey a message to Moscow . ” Confronted with ISI opposition , ” Yaqoob wanted to develop the Zahir Shah option through a Soviet endorsement . ” But Forign Minister Shevadnadze made clear in Moscow that he considered it ” impractical to replace the leader of what was an established structure in Kabul
Gen Zia , Gen Akhter and The Geneva negotiation.