Gen Zia , Gen Akhtar and Geneva Agreement Part 2

Gen Zia , Gen Akhtar and Geneva Agreement Part 2

Author

Diego Cordoves and Seling s Harrison

Zia’s new civilian prime minister Mohammad Khan Junejo , sympathiszed with Yaqoob’s efforts but lacked the power to challenge the ISI , which reports directly and exclusively to the President .
Another important factor that killed the Yaqoob’s initiative was the replacement of ISI Director General Gen Akhter Abdul Rehman in late March by Lieutenant General Hameed Gul , a militant fundamentalist who was described in a secret CIA assessment at the time as ” a real fire-breather in religious matters . Gul was even more adamantly opposed to a political compromise than Gen Akhter . He wanted the resistance groups to hold an elected assembly , or shura , of their own that would choose a shadow government . The formal announcement of plans for the shura in May marked the end of serious Pakistani interest in the Zahir Shah option , or any other form of coalition compromise with the PDPA . Several Soviet military setbacks during mid – 1987 reinforced the ISI’s belief that the resistance could win on the battlefield and did not have to make political compromises .
The six months leading up to the Genava accords were marked by an intensifying domestic power struggle in Pakistan that was directly linked with differences over Afghan policy .
Yielding to pressure for March 1987 . The new civilian prime minister Junejo , maintained a low profile at first but gradually began to assert himself , even on important military budget and personnel matters , increasingly ruffling Zia’s feathers . In November 1987 , without consulting Zia , Junejo ousted Yaqoob as foreign Minister , taking over the portfolio himself . He then ordered Foreign Secretary Abdul Sattar to discontue Yaqoob,s practice of sending all important foreign policy decisions for final approval to Zia . ” It was constitutionally correct for me to send the files only to Foreign Minister , or to the Prime Minister , ” Sattar told me in a 1989 interview . ” It was for the Prime Minister to decide what decisions to refer to the President . But Gen Zia was used to do this, and it upset him greatly , especially at a time when we were all beginning to take the responsibility of a Soviet withdrawal more seriously . Zia had gone along with the United States during 1987 in opposing the Soviet policy of linking the withdrawal to U.S and Pakistani acceptance of a coalition government . In early 1988 , however , Zia reversed himself , announcing his own version of “linkage” . In a series of interviews in January , he declared that Pakistan would not sign the Geneva accords unlessMoscow removed Najibullah and agreed to an interim government to be chosen through process dominated by the Pakistan based resistance groups . The kabul regime could have indirect minority representation through neutral , non Communist Afghans.