,

Avoiding Armageddon 4

Avoiding Armageddon 4

When Brezinski offered $ 400 million in aid over two years , Zia turned down the offer as a ” peanuts ” a gratuitous insult to Carter , a peanut farmer from Georgia .

On Jan 10 , 1980 , the first CIA provided arms for the mujahedin arrived in Pakistan via the ISI .

Author

Bruce Riedel

The pro – Soviet coup in Kabul forced Carter to change his view of Pakistan . The country that he had literally flown over in 1978 was now critical to stopping the Soviets . To Carter , shaken by the fall of the Shah of Iran and by the Marxist coup in Kabul , it looked as if Southwest Asia were crumbling into enemy hands . In July 1979 , Carter ordered the CIA to provide modest assistance to the rebelion against the communist government in Kabul , but this aid was low level , involving mostly propaganda support and very modest amounts of money but no weapons .

The Soviet invasion cemented the change in Washington , and it would lead to a renewal of  America’s cold war love affair with the Pakistani army and inter – services Intelligence . Carter’s national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski travelled to Pakistan after the invasion and offered more assistance for the mojahedin and for Pakistan . When Brezinski offered $ 400 million in aid over two years , Zia turned down the offer as a ” peanuts ” a gratuitous insult to Carter , a peanut farmer from Georgia . But Zia allowed the bilateral relationship between the ISI and the Saudis General Intelligence Directorate to become a trilateral CIA-ISI-GID relationship in which washington and Riyadh provided matching grants of money and purchased arms and Islamabad handled distribution and training . On Jan 10 , 1980 , the first CIA provided arms for the mujahedin arrived in Pakistan via the ISI .

Avoiding Armageddon

The Carter and Reagan years

page 95

/0 Comments/by
,

Avoiding Armageddon 3

Avoiding Armageddon 3

Pakistan and Saudi Arab were the first ally against Soviet invasion in Afghanistan 

As the Soviets invaded Afghanistan , Zia dispatched Gen Akhter to Riyadh with an urgent message for the king .

Zia wanted Saudis assistance to strengthen the mujahedin , the anti communist rebels in Afghanistan

Author

Bruce Riedel

In 1979 Marxist officers in the Afghan army overthrew the neutralist Afghan government of President Daoud and began to import communist ideology and polices into the country . Large parts of the rural countryside rose in rebellion . Many of the rebels had long had contacts with Pakistan religious parties , especially the Jamaat e Islami and with the ISI. Zia openly favored the rebels and Gen Akhter’s ISI began arming and helping them . The Afghan communist government first appealed the Moscow for arms and advisers and then for Russian troops . Initially , Moscow was reluctant to get into what appeared to be a growing civil war and a possible quagmire . But as the situation deteriorated , the Soviet leadership decided that it must intervene to save a client state .

On the eve of the December 25 , 1979, the invasion began : 85,000 Soviet soldiers entered the country and the borders of the Soviet bloc advanced to Pakistan’s western frontiers . However , Moscow still showed signs of ambivalence about the project . The Soviets could have put many more troops into the fight if they chose to do so. While they had invaded Czechoslovakia in 1968 with a 250,000-man army , they were fighting in Afghanistan , a much larger and more challenging country , with a smaller force .

Zia immediately turned to Saudi Arabia for help and assistance . The Saudis and Pakistanis had a long history of cooperation ; Pakistan received significant aid from Riyadh , and many Pakistani emigre workers were employed in the kingdom , including in the Saudi Army , navy and airforce. The Saudis had been worried about the deteriorated situation in Afghanistan even before the Marxist officers took over . During a visit to Riyadh the year before the coup, their intelligence chief , Prince Turki bin Faisal had warned President Daoud of the communist threat .

As the Soviets invaded Afghanistan , Zia dispatched Gen Akhter to Riyadh with an urgent message for the king . Zia wanted Saudis assistance to strengthen the mujahedin , the anti communist rebels in Afghanistan . According to Prince Turki , King Fahad agreed immediately , and the ISI and Turki’s General Intelligence Directorate ( GID ) began cooperating to aid the mujahedin . Saudi money began pouring into the ISI , and Saudi authorities and Saudi authorities also encouraged private citizens to give money to help in the war  against the Soviets and to join the jihad . In addition , the Saudi – Pakistan partnership would soon acquire

Avoiding Armageddon

The Carter and Reagan years

page 89 – 90

/0 Comments/by
,

Avoiding Armageddon 2

Avoiding Armageddon 2

ISI under Gen Akhter Abdul Rehman’s command

Akhter vastly expanded the size and strength of the service and  much of its growth  was design to wage jihad in Afghanistan

Author

Bruce Riedel

The Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence grew . Zia’s handpicked choice for director general in 1979 was a Pashtun , Akhter Abdul Rehman , better known simply as General Akhter . He hated publicity and the press and avoided being photographed . Akhter , whom his subordinates described as ” a cold , reserved personality , almost inscrutable , always secretive was a gifted intelligence officer , and he knew afghan world well . He developed close working ties to many of Afghan mujahedin leaders , especially fellow pashtuns , and organised them into political parties to give more legitimacy to their struggle . Akhter also built strong ISI links to the CIA and the Saudis . He was the first director general of tha ISI that i met with .

At Zia’s directions , Akhter vastly expanded the size and strength of the service . According to one estimate , the ISI went from a staff of 2000 in 1978 to 40000 employees and a billion dollar budget by 1988. It came to be seen in Pakistan as omnipotent , listening in on every phone call, planting informants in every village , city , block and public space . Politicians were on its payroll and the enemies simply disappeared . Much of its growth was design to keep Zia in power , but much of it was also to wage jihad . As one ot Akhter’s deputies would later say , ” the ISI was and still is probably the most powerful and influential organisation in the country ” ; he also remarked that Akhter was ” regarded with envy or fear ” , even by his fellow officers. 

Avoiding Armageddon

The Carter and Reagan years

page 88

/0 Comments/by
,

Avoiding Armageddon 1

Avoiding Armageddon 1

Author

Bruce Riedel

In the 1980’s American enjoyed Pakistan’s support and won the war .

Now in twenty first century , America and Pakistan are an opposite sides in Afghanistan

TAMPA , FLORIDA IS a long way from South Asia , but in mid – 2011 I was there to attend a conference at the headquarters of the U.S. Central command on Pakistan as a guest of General David Petraeus , the U.S commander on Afghanistan. CENTCOM is the regional command of the that part of the U.S military whose area of responsibility includes Pakistan , but not India . I have been to CENTCOM many times over the past three decades to discuss American war plans and military missions . This time i was to review Pakistan ‘s role in supporting the Taliban movement in Afghanistan . My message was simple , the United States was fighting a proxy war with Pakistan in Afghanistan .

The audience was not thrilled with the message . They knew that i was right , but the hard truth of it was not eagerly welcomed by American commanders . After all only twenty five years ago the United States had fought a war against the Soviets in Afghanistan with Pakistan’s help . I was a junior player in that war effort , but even i could see that it would be much easier for the United States to win if Pakistan provided it and its allies with safe heavens along the border and a sanctuary in which to train and prepare to fight . In the 1980s President Ronald Reagan enjoyed Pakistan’s support and won the war . Now in twenty first century , America and Pakistan are an opposite sides in Afghan civil war . It’s a lot harder to envision success .

CENTCOM planners look at Pakistan from the west . It sits at the edge of their area of responsibility ( AOR ) , on the far end of the Middle East and the Persian Gulf ; consequently CENTCOM sees Pakistan primarily in terms of how its actions polices affact Afghanistan and the Gulf . Pakistan’s military leaders , of course , look primarily the other way , east toward India . They are obsessed with India and the threat they believe that it poses to their country . So America and Pakistan generals , and diplomats and spies for that matter , generally look at the world with different priorities . Sometimes they can find common grounds for short term reasons , like fighting communism in Kabul , but generally their strategic views are at odds with each other .

Avoiding Armageddon

The Carter and Reagan years

page 81 – 82

/0 Comments/by
,

جنرل اختر عبدالرحمن کی افغان ڈاکٹرین حکمت

جنرل اختر عبدالرحمن کی افغان ڈاکٹرین حکمت

تحریر: یار خان

افغانستان پاکستان کا مسلمان ہمسایہ ملک ہے اور اس سے پاکستان کے مسلمانوں کے تہذیبی رشتے صدیوں پرانے ہیں؛ لیکن بدقسمتی سے ریاستی سطح پر پاکستان اور افغانستان کے درمیان ہمیشہ ایک تناو رہا ہے، جو عالمی حالات و واقعات کے زیر اثر گھٹتا بڑھتا رہتا ہے۔اس کے باوجود دسمبر 1979ء میں جب سوویت یونین نے افغانستان میں اپنی فوجیں داخل کیں تو پاکستان نے ایک سچے مسلمان بھائی کی طرح اپنے افغان بھائیوں کی جدوجہد آزادی میں ان کا بھرپور ساتھ دیا اور ان کے شانہ بہ شانہ افغانستان کی سرزمین پر سوویت یونین کے خلاف ایک ایسی جنگ لڑی، جو دنیا کی جنگوں کی تاریخ میں اپنی نوعیت کی منفرد جنگ تھی۔ عسکری اصطلاح میں اس کو پراکسی وار یعنی بالواسطہ جنگ بھی کہہ سکتے ہیں۔ یہ جنگ پاکستان کی خفیہ ایجنسی آئی ایس آئی نے لڑی، جس کی کمان اس وقت جنرل اختر عبدالرحمن کر رہے تھے۔ یہ وہی جنرل اختر عبدالرحمن ہیں، جن کو17 اگست 1988ء میں ایک عالمی سازش کے تحت جنرل ضیاالحق کے ساتھ ہی شہید کر دیا گیا، تاکہ شکست کے بعد سوویت یونین کی افغانستان سے بحفاظت پسپائی میں کوئی رکاوٹ پیدا نہ ہو۔ یہ جنگ جو جنرل اختر عبدالرحمن کی افغان ڈاکٹرین کے تحت لڑی اور جیتی گئی، اس کا مقصد یہ بھی تھا کہ اس کے بعد پاکستان اور افغانستان میں ریاستی سطح پر کشیدگی ہمیشہ کے لیے ختم ہو جائے گی۔ جنرل اختر عبدالرحمن کی افغان ڈاکٹرین کیا تھی، آئیے دیکھتے ہیں۔ ان کی افغان ڈاکٹرین کا پہلا نکتہ وہ تھا، جس کے تحت انہوں نے افغان قبائل اور مزاحمتی تنظیموں کے درمیان کوئی امتیازی سلوک روا نہیں رکھا اور سب کے ساتھ یکساں برتاو کیا۔ ان کی راے یہ تھی کہ خرابی تب پیدا ہوتی ہے، جب ہم فیورٹ ازم کا شکار ہو جاتے ہیں۔ یہ وہ ڈاکٹرین تھی جس کی وجہ سے جنرل اخترعبدالرحمن تمام افغان قبائل اور جہادی تنظیموں کو نہ صرف روسی حملہ کے خلاف متحد کرنے میں کامیاب ہو گئے، بلکہ ان قبائل اور تنظیموں کو آئی ایس آئی کی کمان تلے کام کرنے پر بھی کوئی اعتراض نہیں ہوا۔ اس طرح ان انہوں نے افغان قبائل کی بکھری ہوئی قوت کو اکٹھا کیا اور تھوڑے ہی عرصہ میں ایک بہت بڑی فوجی طاقت میں تبدیل کردیا۔ Stephen Tanner اپنی کتاب ” الیگزینڈر دی گریٹ سے زوال طالبان تک، عسکری اور تاریخی جائزہ“ میں لکھتے ہیں: جنرل اختر عبدالرحمن نے جنرل ضیاالحق سے کہا کہ سوویت یونین کے خلاف براہ راست لڑیں گے افغان ہی، پاکستان مگر پیچھے رہ کر ان کو فوجی اسلحہ اور ٹریننگ دے گا۔ اس میں یہ احتیاط ضرورکی جائے گی کہ جنگ کا درجہ حرارت ایک خاص سطح پر رکھا جائے، تاکہ سوویت یونین پاکستان پر ہی نہ چڑھ دوڑے۔“ بعینہ امریکہ کے عسکری محقق Bruce Ridel نے بھی اپنی کتاب ”افغانستان میں امریکہ کی خفیہ جنگ“ میں اعتراف کیا ہے کہ: یہ پاکستان کی خفیہ ایجنسی آئی ایس آئی تھی، جس نے سوویت یونین کے خلاف افغان مجاہدین کو لیڈرشپ، ٹریننگ اور سٹریٹجی فراہم کی اور یہ افغان عوام اور پاکستان ہی تھا، جنہوں نے اس خطرناک اور عظیم جنگ کا تمام خطرہ مول لیا اور قربانیاں دی تھیں۔“ حقیقتاً امریکہ اور یورپ کو شروع میں یقین ہی نہیں آتا تھا کہ آئی ایس آئی اور افغان کے بکھرے ہوئے قبائل ایسی خطرناک اور طویل گوریلا جنگ لڑ سکیں گے۔ لہذا ابتدائی طور پر امریکہ اور یورپ نے پاکستان کواس مد میں مالی امداد مہیا کرنے میں کوئی دلچسپی ظاہر نہیں کی۔ صرف سعودی عرب بھائی چارے کے تحت مدد دے رہا تھا۔ ابتدائی دو سال اسی طرح گزر گئے،اس کے بعد جا کر امریکہ اور یورپ کو اپنی غلطی کا احساس ہوا اور اس نے مالی اور اسلحی امداد کی فراہمی شروع کی، بلکہ اس کے بعد تو جب جنرل اختر عبدالرحمن نے افغان مجاہدین کو سٹنگر میزائل مہیا کرنے کا مطالبہ کیا تو یہ بھی ان کو پورا کرنا پڑا۔ جنرل اختر عبدالرحمن کی افغان ڈاکٹرین کو دوسرا نکتہ وہ تھا، جس کے تحت افغان جنگ کی کامیابی کے بعد انہوں نے یہ تجویز دی کہ معاہدہ جینوا پر دستخط کرنے سے پہلے امریکہ اور سوویت یونین سے افغانستان میں مستحکم حکومت کے قیام کا مطالبہ منوایا جائے، اور یہ کہ اگر یہ مطالبہ نہ منوایا گیا تو روسی فوجوں کے انخلا کے ساتھ ہی افغانستان میں خانہ جنگی شروع ہو جائے گا، جس کا نتیجہ کسی دوسری عالمی طاقت کے افغانستان پر چڑھ دوڑنے کی صورت میں نکل سکتا ہے۔ آج امریکہ اوراس کے اعلیٰ عہدے دار تسلیم کرتے ہیں کہ سوویت یونین کی واپسی کے بعد امریکہ نے افغانستان میں مستحکم حکومت قائم کرنے کی اپنی ذمے داری پوری نہیں کی۔یہ ذمے داری اگر پوری کر دی جاتی تو بعد میں افغانستان میں وہ انتشار برپا نہیں ہونا تھا، جو ہوا۔ قرائن سے اندازہ ہوتا ہے کہ جنرل اختر عبدالرحمن، جو اب چیئرمین جوائنٹ چیفس آف سٹاف تھے، جنرل ضیاالحق کو اس پر بھی قائل کرچکے تھے۔اس کے بعد ہی جنرل ضیاالحق نے ایک میٹنگ میں وزیراعظم جونیجو اور ان کے وزیروں کو براہ راست مخاطب کرتے ہوئے کہا کہ اگر آپ نے افغانستان میں مستحکم عبوری حکومت کا مطالبہ منوائے بغیر عجلت میں جینیوا معاہدہ پر دستخط کر دیے تو لوگ آپ کی بوٹیاں نوچ لیں گے۔ بدقسمتی سے جونیجو حکومت پر اس وقت امریکہ کی خوشنودی حاصل کرنے کا بھوت سوار تھا۔ اس نے اپوزیشن کو ساتھ ملا کر جینیوا معاہدہ پر دستخط کردیے۔ جنرل اختر عبدالرحمن کی اسی مخالفت کے باعث محمد خان جونیجو نے اوجڑی کیمپ کے سانحہ کی ذمے داری بھی ان پر ڈالنے کی کوشش کی، حالانکہ اس وقت وہ آئی ایس آئی چیف نہیں تھے۔ یہ کوشش تو کامیاب نہ ہوئی، البتہ اس کشمکش میں 29 مئی 1988ء کو جونیجو خود اپنی حکومت سے ہاتھ دھو بیٹھے۔ آج تاریخ کا ہر طالب علم سمجھ سکتا ہے کہ اگر افغان جنگ کی کامیابی کے بعد جنرل اختر عبدالرحمن کی ڈاکٹرین پر اس کی روح کے مطابق عمل کیا جاتا تو افغانستان میں ایک ایسی حکومت معرض وجود میں آجانا تھی، جو نہ صرف یہ کہ پاکستان کی زبردست حامی ہوتی، بلکہ پاکستان کو اپنا محسن بھی سمجھتی اور پاکستان کو افغان بارڈر کی طرف سے کوئی خطرہ نہ رہتا۔ افسوس تو یہ ہے کہ 17 اگست 1988ء کو جنرل اختر عبدالرحمن کی شہادت کے بعد بھی پاکستان کی مختلف حکومتوں نے ان کی افغان ڈاکٹرین کے برعکس افغانستان میں فیورٹ ازم کی پالیسی اختیار کی، جس کے نتیجہ میں افغانستان میں اندرونی انتشار بھی پیدا ہوا اور افغانستان کی نئی ابھرنے والی قیادت، خواہ وہ طالبان کی تھی، یا مخالف طالبان کی، مستقل طور پر پاکستان سے بدظن، بلکہ برگشتہ ہو گئی، اور تادم تحریر یہی صورت حال ہے۔ اس تناظر میں یہ کہنا غلط نہیں ہو گا کہ پاکستان آج بھی اگر اس صورت حال سے نکل سکتا ہے تو جنرل اختر عبدالرحمن کی وضع کردہ افغان ڈاکٹرین پر عمل کرنے سے ہی نکل سکتا ہے اور یہی ڈاکٹرین پاکستان اور افغانستان کے درمیان پرامن، دیرپا اور خوشگوار تعلقات کی ضامن بن سکتی ہے

/0 Comments/by
,

Gen Zia , Gen Akhtar and Geneva Agreement Part 3

Gen Zia , Gen Akhtar and Geneva Agreement Part 3

Author

Diego Cordoves and Seling s Harrison

While acknowledging that Zia had geopolitical objectives in Afghanistan , former Foreign Secretary Sattar expressed his own belief that Zia’s power struggle with Junejo was the governing factor behind the President’s eleventh hour attempt to delay the signing of the accords . ” He had made up his mind to dismiss Junejo as soon as he could “, Sattar observed . ” He thought it would be more easily accepted in the West it the Afghan conflict was still in progress , rather than after the Geneva agreement was signed and the Soviets were on their way out .
“What Zia did not anticipate was the political skill with which Junejo would use the Afghan issue as a weapon to fortify his own position . Zia finally did oust the civilian government in May , but lost his struggle to block Pakistani support of the Geneva accords after Junejo mobilized public opinion in a bold challenge to the President .
A plodding , soft spoken machine politician , Junejo had studiously avoided controversy during his rise to power . His determined stand surprised friends and foes alike . On February 17 Junejo invited 11 leading editors to a briefing in which he explained why he felt Pakistan should sign the accords . Among other things , he explained , ” Our American and Saudi friends would not forgive us , and they are reminding me of this day after day “. Outraged , Zia held his own briefing on the following day , charging that “American and Soviet Union have made a secret agreement of the Afghan issue , and they are attempting to smear Pakistan in the bargain as an obstacle to peace “.
The United States , Zia said , ” is only interested in the withdrawal of the Soviet troops .
It does not care what happened to the Afghan afterwards “.Over Zia’s protest Junejo then convened a Round Table Conference on March 5 and 6 , assembling the leaders of all Pakistan’s nineteen political parties . Only the Jamaat e Islami and two other fundamentalist groups dissented from the majority view that Pakistan should sign the accords . Following the sessions Junejo invited his cabinet to a dinner at his house , where all the ministers except one voiced support for the accords . Junejo’s deputy in the Forign Ministry , Minister of state Zain Noorani , recalled that Zia arrived late and then spoke passionately for forty minutes against signing .

” Zia went scarlet , ” Noorani said , ” when one of his most loyal lieutenants Ghulam Ishaq Khan , then Finance Minister and later to succeed Zia as president , ” demolished every point that Zia had made without any apology .” Stalking out of the meeting , Zia warned that ” our people will lynch you if you sign . “Ultimately , faced with domestic and foreign pressure , Zia dropped his opposition to the accords . Washington and Moscow gave him face saving statements pledging to step up their efforts to establish an interim government. In a conversation with me on June 29 , Zia reaffirmed his belief that the accords were a setback for Pakistan .”
Eventually Gorbachev would have blinked , ” he said , ” If the United States had insisted on the removal of the Kabul regime as a condition for the conclusion of the accords , as he and some Americans , including former U.N Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrich , were advocating . Even if this had meant the breakdown of the settlement process in April , zia declared , the Soviet Union ” would have come back sooner or later . Gorbachev pulled a fast one by leaving Najib behind . He threw the bait by agreeing to withdraw without a change of regime , and it was swallowed . “Zia said that ha would give Cordovez six months within which to establish an interim government . Waving his hand , he added that ” he would not succeed because it’s not possible for all of these groups to merge in a pot palatable to the people . The mujahedin have sacrificed . We will either throw Najib out of Kabul or establish a provisional government inside Afghanistan first and then throw him out . ” Zia spoke of a Pakistan -Afghanistan confederation in which Pakistani and Afghans could travel freely back and forth without passports . He did not foresee that dissolution of the Soviet Union was only three years away when he envisaged a pan -Islamic bloc that would one day win over the Muslims in the Soviet Union …… who knows ….. perhaps even Tajikistan and Uzbekistan , you will see . “

/0 Comments/by