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Gen Zia , Gen Akhtar and Geneva Agreement Part 3

Gen Zia , Gen Akhtar and Geneva Agreement Part 3

Author

Diego Cordoves and Seling s Harrison

While acknowledging that Zia had geopolitical objectives in Afghanistan , former Foreign Secretary Sattar expressed his own belief that Zia’s power struggle with Junejo was the governing factor behind the President’s eleventh hour attempt to delay the signing of the accords . ” He had made up his mind to dismiss Junejo as soon as he could “, Sattar observed . ” He thought it would be more easily accepted in the West it the Afghan conflict was still in progress , rather than after the Geneva agreement was signed and the Soviets were on their way out .
“What Zia did not anticipate was the political skill with which Junejo would use the Afghan issue as a weapon to fortify his own position . Zia finally did oust the civilian government in May , but lost his struggle to block Pakistani support of the Geneva accords after Junejo mobilized public opinion in a bold challenge to the President .
A plodding , soft spoken machine politician , Junejo had studiously avoided controversy during his rise to power . His determined stand surprised friends and foes alike . On February 17 Junejo invited 11 leading editors to a briefing in which he explained why he felt Pakistan should sign the accords . Among other things , he explained , ” Our American and Saudi friends would not forgive us , and they are reminding me of this day after day “. Outraged , Zia held his own briefing on the following day , charging that “American and Soviet Union have made a secret agreement of the Afghan issue , and they are attempting to smear Pakistan in the bargain as an obstacle to peace “.
The United States , Zia said , ” is only interested in the withdrawal of the Soviet troops .
It does not care what happened to the Afghan afterwards “.Over Zia’s protest Junejo then convened a Round Table Conference on March 5 and 6 , assembling the leaders of all Pakistan’s nineteen political parties . Only the Jamaat e Islami and two other fundamentalist groups dissented from the majority view that Pakistan should sign the accords . Following the sessions Junejo invited his cabinet to a dinner at his house , where all the ministers except one voiced support for the accords . Junejo’s deputy in the Forign Ministry , Minister of state Zain Noorani , recalled that Zia arrived late and then spoke passionately for forty minutes against signing .

” Zia went scarlet , ” Noorani said , ” when one of his most loyal lieutenants Ghulam Ishaq Khan , then Finance Minister and later to succeed Zia as president , ” demolished every point that Zia had made without any apology .” Stalking out of the meeting , Zia warned that ” our people will lynch you if you sign . “Ultimately , faced with domestic and foreign pressure , Zia dropped his opposition to the accords . Washington and Moscow gave him face saving statements pledging to step up their efforts to establish an interim government. In a conversation with me on June 29 , Zia reaffirmed his belief that the accords were a setback for Pakistan .”
Eventually Gorbachev would have blinked , ” he said , ” If the United States had insisted on the removal of the Kabul regime as a condition for the conclusion of the accords , as he and some Americans , including former U.N Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrich , were advocating . Even if this had meant the breakdown of the settlement process in April , zia declared , the Soviet Union ” would have come back sooner or later . Gorbachev pulled a fast one by leaving Najib behind . He threw the bait by agreeing to withdraw without a change of regime , and it was swallowed . “Zia said that ha would give Cordovez six months within which to establish an interim government . Waving his hand , he added that ” he would not succeed because it’s not possible for all of these groups to merge in a pot palatable to the people . The mujahedin have sacrificed . We will either throw Najib out of Kabul or establish a provisional government inside Afghanistan first and then throw him out . ” Zia spoke of a Pakistan -Afghanistan confederation in which Pakistani and Afghans could travel freely back and forth without passports . He did not foresee that dissolution of the Soviet Union was only three years away when he envisaged a pan -Islamic bloc that would one day win over the Muslims in the Soviet Union …… who knows ….. perhaps even Tajikistan and Uzbekistan , you will see . “

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Gen Zia , Gen Akhtar and Geneva Agreement Part 2

Gen Zia , Gen Akhtar and Geneva Agreement Part 2

Author

Diego Cordoves and Seling s Harrison

Zia’s new civilian prime minister Mohammad Khan Junejo , sympathiszed with Yaqoob’s efforts but lacked the power to challenge the ISI , which reports directly and exclusively to the President .
Another important factor that killed the Yaqoob’s initiative was the replacement of ISI Director General Gen Akhter Abdul Rehman in late March by Lieutenant General Hameed Gul , a militant fundamentalist who was described in a secret CIA assessment at the time as ” a real fire-breather in religious matters . Gul was even more adamantly opposed to a political compromise than Gen Akhter . He wanted the resistance groups to hold an elected assembly , or shura , of their own that would choose a shadow government . The formal announcement of plans for the shura in May marked the end of serious Pakistani interest in the Zahir Shah option , or any other form of coalition compromise with the PDPA . Several Soviet military setbacks during mid – 1987 reinforced the ISI’s belief that the resistance could win on the battlefield and did not have to make political compromises .
The six months leading up to the Genava accords were marked by an intensifying domestic power struggle in Pakistan that was directly linked with differences over Afghan policy .
Yielding to pressure for March 1987 . The new civilian prime minister Junejo , maintained a low profile at first but gradually began to assert himself , even on important military budget and personnel matters , increasingly ruffling Zia’s feathers . In November 1987 , without consulting Zia , Junejo ousted Yaqoob as foreign Minister , taking over the portfolio himself . He then ordered Foreign Secretary Abdul Sattar to discontue Yaqoob,s practice of sending all important foreign policy decisions for final approval to Zia . ” It was constitutionally correct for me to send the files only to Foreign Minister , or to the Prime Minister , ” Sattar told me in a 1989 interview . ” It was for the Prime Minister to decide what decisions to refer to the President . But Gen Zia was used to do this, and it upset him greatly , especially at a time when we were all beginning to take the responsibility of a Soviet withdrawal more seriously . Zia had gone along with the United States during 1987 in opposing the Soviet policy of linking the withdrawal to U.S and Pakistani acceptance of a coalition government . In early 1988 , however , Zia reversed himself , announcing his own version of “linkage” . In a series of interviews in January , he declared that Pakistan would not sign the Geneva accords unlessMoscow removed Najibullah and agreed to an interim government to be chosen through process dominated by the Pakistan based resistance groups . The kabul regime could have indirect minority representation through neutral , non Communist Afghans.

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Gen Zia , Gen Akhtar and Geneva Agreement Part 1

Gen Zia , Gen Akhtar and Geneva Agreement Part 1

Author
Diego Cordoves and Seling s Harrison

The Geneva negotiations were stallen in mid – 1985 , nominally over the issue of a withdrawal timetable . But the cordovez recognized that the key reason for Soviet foot dragging was the lack of progress on a coalition formula that would stabilize the Kabul regime before the withdrawal started . In July he submitted a memorandum containing a ” Scenario ” for a coalition to Islamabad , Kabul , Moscow and Washington . He proposed a U.N – facilitated Geneva meeting of Afghanistan leaders to set up ” broadly based transitional arrangements ” that would embrace the seven parties , the PDPA and ” selected personalities ” among prominent Afghan exiles . Although the “Scenario” was not specific , Cordovez made clear that he saw a pivotal role for Zahir Shah in this scenario . Rejecting Najib Ullah’s demand for PDPA control of the presidency and the armed forces , he wrote that ” no party would be assured a predominate role in the transitional arrangements .
To put the picture in perspective , it should be noted that Pakistani leaders were not unanimous during 1987 with respect to the type of post war Afghan government that would best serve Pakistani interests . The ISI was more determined than ever to install a fundamentalist – dominated regime that it assumed would be closely linked to Islamabad . Gen Akhter Abdul Rehman Khan , the ISI Director argued that the talk of political compromise would dampen the fighting spirit of the resistance groups . Foreign Minister Yaqub Khan on the other hand maintained that a stable transition without bloodshed could be achieved only through a coalition that gave a key role to moderate resistance elements and included PDPA participation . Najib Ullah in the scenario would be replaced by a neutral personality. As it happened , although Yaqoob was unaware of the internal debate that raging in Moscow , he was pursuing a solution that was almost identical to what Kornienko and Akhromeyev had in mind . According to Riaz Mohammad Khan , then the Foreign Minister’s Director of Afghan Affairs , Yaqoob was convinced that the former King Zahir Shah , could play a pivotal role in the transitional period as a personality agreeable to Moscow and with visible support among nationalists and refugees .
President Zia agreed with the ISI approach , but he authorized Yaqoob to test the Soviet reaction . Yaqoob then embarked on what proved to be an abortive three – month diplomatic initiative during early 1987 . As he recalled in a 1992 interview , he knew that he would be actively subverted by the ISI and would get no help from Zia . Still he hoped that a conciliatory Soviet attitude would give him leverage in his internal battles . His first setback came when Soviet deputy Forign Minister Anatoliy visiting Islamabad in mid – January , made his expected appeal for acceptance of Najibullah’s “national reconciliation” overtures . Yaqoob countered with a proposal for a board – based coalition headed by a neutral personality .
Yaqoob made two trips to Moscow during February with a trip in between to Rome for a meeting with Zahir Shah’s advisers . The purpose of the Rome trip , writes Riaz Mohammad Khan ,” was to convey a message to Moscow . ” Confronted with ISI opposition , ” Yaqoob wanted to develop the Zahir Shah option through a Soviet endorsement . ” But Forign Minister Shevadnadze made clear in Moscow that he considered it ” impractical to replace the leader of what was an established structure in Kabul
Gen Zia , Gen Akhter and The Geneva negotiation.

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