Avoiding Armageddon 1

Author

Bruce Riedel

In the 1980’s American enjoyed Pakistan’s support and won the war .

Now in twenty first century , America and Pakistan are an opposite sides in Afghanistan

TAMPA , FLORIDA IS a long way from South Asia , but in mid – 2011 I was there to attend a conference at the headquarters of the U.S. Central command on Pakistan as a guest of General David Petraeus , the U.S commander on Afghanistan. CENTCOM is the regional command of the that part of the U.S military whose area of responsibility includes Pakistan , but not India . I have been to CENTCOM many times over the past three decades to discuss American war plans and military missions . This time i was to review Pakistan ‘s role in supporting the Taliban movement in Afghanistan . My message was simple , the United States was fighting a proxy war with Pakistan in Afghanistan .

The audience was not thrilled with the message . They knew that i was right , but the hard truth of it was not eagerly welcomed by American commanders . After all only twenty five years ago the United States had fought a war against the Soviets in Afghanistan with Pakistan’s help . I was a junior player in that war effort , but even i could see that it would be much easier for the United States to win if Pakistan provided it and its allies with safe heavens along the border and a sanctuary in which to train and prepare to fight . In the 1980s President Ronald Reagan enjoyed Pakistan’s support and won the war . Now in twenty first century , America and Pakistan are an opposite sides in Afghan civil war . It’s a lot harder to envision success .

CENTCOM planners look at Pakistan from the west . It sits at the edge of their area of responsibility ( AOR ) , on the far end of the Middle East and the Persian Gulf ; consequently CENTCOM sees Pakistan primarily in terms of how its actions polices affact Afghanistan and the Gulf . Pakistan’s military leaders , of course , look primarily the other way , east toward India . They are obsessed with India and the threat they believe that it poses to their country . So America and Pakistan generals , and diplomats and spies for that matter , generally look at the world with different priorities . Sometimes they can find common grounds for short term reasons , like fighting communism in Kabul , but generally their strategic views are at odds with each other .

Avoiding Armageddon

The Carter and Reagan years

page 81 – 82

Gen Zia , Gen Akhtar and Geneva Agreement Part 3

Author

Diego Cordoves and Seling s Harrison

While acknowledging that Zia had geopolitical objectives in Afghanistan , former Foreign Secretary Sattar expressed his own belief that Zia’s power struggle with Junejo was the governing factor behind the President’s eleventh hour attempt to delay the signing of the accords . ” He had made up his mind to dismiss Junejo as soon as he could “, Sattar observed . ” He thought it would be more easily accepted in the West it the Afghan conflict was still in progress , rather than after the Geneva agreement was signed and the Soviets were on their way out .
“What Zia did not anticipate was the political skill with which Junejo would use the Afghan issue as a weapon to fortify his own position . Zia finally did oust the civilian government in May , but lost his struggle to block Pakistani support of the Geneva accords after Junejo mobilized public opinion in a bold challenge to the President .
A plodding , soft spoken machine politician , Junejo had studiously avoided controversy during his rise to power . His determined stand surprised friends and foes alike . On February 17 Junejo invited 11 leading editors to a briefing in which he explained why he felt Pakistan should sign the accords . Among other things , he explained , ” Our American and Saudi friends would not forgive us , and they are reminding me of this day after day “. Outraged , Zia held his own briefing on the following day , charging that “American and Soviet Union have made a secret agreement of the Afghan issue , and they are attempting to smear Pakistan in the bargain as an obstacle to peace “.
The United States , Zia said , ” is only interested in the withdrawal of the Soviet troops .
It does not care what happened to the Afghan afterwards “.Over Zia’s protest Junejo then convened a Round Table Conference on March 5 and 6 , assembling the leaders of all Pakistan’s nineteen political parties . Only the Jamaat e Islami and two other fundamentalist groups dissented from the majority view that Pakistan should sign the accords . Following the sessions Junejo invited his cabinet to a dinner at his house , where all the ministers except one voiced support for the accords . Junejo’s deputy in the Forign Ministry , Minister of state Zain Noorani , recalled that Zia arrived late and then spoke passionately for forty minutes against signing .

” Zia went scarlet , ” Noorani said , ” when one of his most loyal lieutenants Ghulam Ishaq Khan , then Finance Minister and later to succeed Zia as president , ” demolished every point that Zia had made without any apology .” Stalking out of the meeting , Zia warned that ” our people will lynch you if you sign . “Ultimately , faced with domestic and foreign pressure , Zia dropped his opposition to the accords . Washington and Moscow gave him face saving statements pledging to step up their efforts to establish an interim government. In a conversation with me on June 29 , Zia reaffirmed his belief that the accords were a setback for Pakistan .”
Eventually Gorbachev would have blinked , ” he said , ” If the United States had insisted on the removal of the Kabul regime as a condition for the conclusion of the accords , as he and some Americans , including former U.N Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrich , were advocating . Even if this had meant the breakdown of the settlement process in April , zia declared , the Soviet Union ” would have come back sooner or later . Gorbachev pulled a fast one by leaving Najib behind . He threw the bait by agreeing to withdraw without a change of regime , and it was swallowed . “Zia said that ha would give Cordovez six months within which to establish an interim government . Waving his hand , he added that ” he would not succeed because it’s not possible for all of these groups to merge in a pot palatable to the people . The mujahedin have sacrificed . We will either throw Najib out of Kabul or establish a provisional government inside Afghanistan first and then throw him out . ” Zia spoke of a Pakistan -Afghanistan confederation in which Pakistani and Afghans could travel freely back and forth without passports . He did not foresee that dissolution of the Soviet Union was only three years away when he envisaged a pan -Islamic bloc that would one day win over the Muslims in the Soviet Union …… who knows ….. perhaps even Tajikistan and Uzbekistan , you will see . “

Gen Zia , Gen Akhtar and Geneva Agreement Part 1

Author
Diego Cordoves and Seling s Harrison

The Geneva negotiations were stallen in mid – 1985 , nominally over the issue of a withdrawal timetable . But the cordovez recognized that the key reason for Soviet foot dragging was the lack of progress on a coalition formula that would stabilize the Kabul regime before the withdrawal started . In July he submitted a memorandum containing a ” Scenario ” for a coalition to Islamabad , Kabul , Moscow and Washington . He proposed a U.N – facilitated Geneva meeting of Afghanistan leaders to set up ” broadly based transitional arrangements ” that would embrace the seven parties , the PDPA and ” selected personalities ” among prominent Afghan exiles . Although the “Scenario” was not specific , Cordovez made clear that he saw a pivotal role for Zahir Shah in this scenario . Rejecting Najib Ullah’s demand for PDPA control of the presidency and the armed forces , he wrote that ” no party would be assured a predominate role in the transitional arrangements .
To put the picture in perspective , it should be noted that Pakistani leaders were not unanimous during 1987 with respect to the type of post war Afghan government that would best serve Pakistani interests . The ISI was more determined than ever to install a fundamentalist – dominated regime that it assumed would be closely linked to Islamabad . Gen Akhter Abdul Rehman Khan , the ISI Director argued that the talk of political compromise would dampen the fighting spirit of the resistance groups . Foreign Minister Yaqub Khan on the other hand maintained that a stable transition without bloodshed could be achieved only through a coalition that gave a key role to moderate resistance elements and included PDPA participation . Najib Ullah in the scenario would be replaced by a neutral personality. As it happened , although Yaqoob was unaware of the internal debate that raging in Moscow , he was pursuing a solution that was almost identical to what Kornienko and Akhromeyev had in mind . According to Riaz Mohammad Khan , then the Foreign Minister’s Director of Afghan Affairs , Yaqoob was convinced that the former King Zahir Shah , could play a pivotal role in the transitional period as a personality agreeable to Moscow and with visible support among nationalists and refugees .
President Zia agreed with the ISI approach , but he authorized Yaqoob to test the Soviet reaction . Yaqoob then embarked on what proved to be an abortive three – month diplomatic initiative during early 1987 . As he recalled in a 1992 interview , he knew that he would be actively subverted by the ISI and would get no help from Zia . Still he hoped that a conciliatory Soviet attitude would give him leverage in his internal battles . His first setback came when Soviet deputy Forign Minister Anatoliy visiting Islamabad in mid – January , made his expected appeal for acceptance of Najibullah’s “national reconciliation” overtures . Yaqoob countered with a proposal for a board – based coalition headed by a neutral personality .
Yaqoob made two trips to Moscow during February with a trip in between to Rome for a meeting with Zahir Shah’s advisers . The purpose of the Rome trip , writes Riaz Mohammad Khan ,” was to convey a message to Moscow . ” Confronted with ISI opposition , ” Yaqoob wanted to develop the Zahir Shah option through a Soviet endorsement . ” But Forign Minister Shevadnadze made clear in Moscow that he considered it ” impractical to replace the leader of what was an established structure in Kabul
Gen Zia , Gen Akhter and The Geneva negotiation.